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Abstract
The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games
is shown under a general condition called “(decomposable) coarser transition
kernels”. This result covers various earlier existence results on correlated
equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with finite actions and state-
independent transitions, and stochastic games with mixtures of constant transition
kernels as special cases. A remarkably simple proof is provided via establishing
a new connection between stochastic games and conditional expectations of
correspondences. New applications of stochastic games are presented as illustrative
examples, including stochastic games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic
dynamic oligopoly model.
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1 Introduction
The class of stochastic games enriches the model of repeated games by allowing
the stage games to vary with some publicly observable states. It has considerably
widened the applications of repeated games.1 In particular, a stochastic game is
played in discrete time by a finite set of players and the past history is observable by
all the players. At the beginning of each stage, Nature draws some state randomly.
After the state is realized, the players choose actions and each player receives a
stage payoff that depends on the current state and the actions. The game then
moves to the next stage and a new random state is drawn, whose distribution
depends on the previous state and chosen actions. The procedure is repeated at
the new state. Each player’s total payoff is the discounted sum of the stage payoffs.
A strategy for a player in a stochastic game is a complete plan of actions,
which specifies a feasible action for the player in every contingency in which
the player might be called on to act. However, the so-called Markov strategies,
which only depend on the current state instead of the entire past history of states
and action profiles, have received much attention in the literature. As noted in
[32], the concept of Markov perfect equilibrium, which requires the players to
use only Markov strategies, embodies various practical virtues and philosophical
considerations, including conceptual and computational simplicity. Given that the
relevant parameters in a stochastic game are time-independent, it is natural to
require the Markov strategies to be time-independent as well. Equilibria based
on such strategies are called stationary Markov perfect equilibria. In a stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium, any subgames with the same current states will be
played exactly in the same way. So “bygones” are really “bygones”; i.e., the past
history does not matter at all.
Beginning with [43], the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
discounted stochastic games remains an important problem. Existence results on
such equilibria in stochastic games with compact action spaces and finite/countable
state spaces have been established in a number of early papers.2 Given the
1See, for example, the book [35] (in particular the survey chapter [4] on economic applications), and
the recent survey chapters [24] and [25].
2The result for zero-sum games with finite actions and states was established in the seminal paper
3
wide applications of stochastic games with general state spaces in various areas
of economics, the existence of equilibria in stationary strategies for such games has
been extensively studied in the last two decades. However, no general existence
result, except for several special classes of stochastic games, has been obtained in
the literature so far.3
The existence of stationary Markov perfect correlated equilibria for stochastic
games was proved in [10] and [40].4 These papers assumed that there is a
randomization device publicly known to all players which is irrelevant to the
fundamental parameters of the game. Stationary Markov perfect equilibria have
been shown to exist in [11], [37] and [42] for stochastic games with some special
structures on the state transitions. The paper [42] focused on stochastic games with
finite actions and state-independent transitions. A class of stochastic games has
been studied in [37], where the transition probability has a fixed countable set of
atoms and its atomless part is a finite combination of atomless measures that do not
depend on states and actions. Stochastic games with a specific product structure,
namely stochastic games with noise, were considered in [11]. In particular, the noise
variable in [11] is a history-irrelevant component of the state and could influence
the payoff functions and transitions. Recently, it was shown in [27] and [28] that
a stochastic game satisfying the usual conditions as stated in Section 2 below may
not have any stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.5 This implies that a general
by [43]. The case with finite state spaces and compact action spaces was shown in [15] and [44]. The
result in [43] was extended by [41] to nonzero-sum games with finite action spaces and countable state
spaces. The existence result for countable state spaces and compact action spaces was then proved by
[14]. Approximate equilibrium has been considered in [36] and [47]. For more detailed discussions about
the literature on stochastic games, see the surveys [24, 25].
3Stochastic games possessing strategic complementarities were studied in [3], [5], [9], [23], [39] and
[46]; see Section 6 in the survey [45] for further discussions. A related class of stochastic games in
which the interaction between different players is sufficiently weak was studied in [21]. The existence
of stationary p-equilibria for two-player games with finite actions and strong separability conditions on
both stage payoffs and state transitions was proved in [19]. The existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria in intergenerational stochastic games was considered in [22] and [38]. Stochastic games with
sub-modularity were studied in [2] and [6]. All these papers impose special conditions on the payoff
functions and state transitions.
4Additional ergodic properties were obtained in [10] under stronger conditions.
5An error in the relevant example of [27] was pointed out in [28], and a new example was presented
therein. In the new example, the discounted stochastic game has a continuum of states, finitely many
players and actions, where all the state transitions are absolutely continuous with respect to a fixed
measure. Since there are only finitely many actions in this stochastic game, any continuity assumptions
in terms of actions will automatically be satisfied.
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existence result could only hold under some suitable conditions.
The first contribution of this paper is to introduce a general condition to
guarantee the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games.
Based on this condition, we unify various existence results in the literature as
discussed in the previous paragraph,6 and also provide a new class of stochastic
games that is useful for economic applications and cannot be handled by existing
results. Our second contribution is methodological. We establish for the first time
a connection between the equilibrium payoff correspondences in stochastic games
and a general result on the conditional expectations of correspondences, and hence
are able to provide a simple proof for the existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss our condition and results
in details.
The transition probability in a general stochastic game is defined in terms of the
actions and state in the previous period. As discussed above, it is assumed in [10],
[11], [40] and [42] that the actions and state in the previous period do not enter the
transition of the sunspot/noise/shock component of the states. As a result, a key
component of the transition probability in those papers is not influenced by the
actions and state in the previous period. However, dynamic economic models with
random shocks are common, and it may seem natural to assume that the transition
of shocks can endogenously depend on some important factors (actions/states) in
the previous stage. As shown by the counterexample in [28], without any restriction
on the transition kernel,7 a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium may not exist.
We introduce a new model called “stochastic games with endogenous shocks”,8
which allows the distribution of current period’s shocks to directly depend on the
“discrete” components of the states and actions from the previous period.9
In order to prove an equilibrium existence result in general stochastic games
6All those papers work with general payoffs, but impose special structure on the state transitions.
7Here the transition kernel means the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the transition probability with
respect to some reference measure on the state space; see Footnote 15 for the definition of Radon-
Nikodym derivative.
8In contrast to the sunspot idea in [10] and [40], the innovation of [11] is to allow the noise to be
part of the stage payoffs. This feature is also shared by stochastic games with endogenous shocks as
considered in this paper.
9Dynamic economic models with some discrete components of actions and states are common, such
as entry or exit by firms in [13] and [20].
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that cover stochastic games with endogenous shocks and the class of games in which
the state transitions have a decomposable feature (see, for example, [37] and [42]),
we propose a condition called “decomposable coarser transition kernels” in the
sense that the transition kernel is decomposed as a sum of finitely many components
with each component being the product of a “coarser” history-relevant transition
function and a history-irrelevant density function. For the case of stochastic games
with endogenous shocks, the history-irrelevant density functions represent the
shocks. In particular, each discrete component of the states and actions from
the previous period naturally contributes one component in the transition kernel,
which describes the history dependence of the distribution of the shock. It thus
captures the intuition that the distribution of the random shock can directly depend
on the actions and states in the previous period.
Our Theorem 1 shows that under the condition of a decomposable coarser
transition kernel, a stochastic game has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. A
very simple proof is given by providing a new link between a convexity type result
of [12] on the conditional expectation of a correspondence and the equilibrium
existence problem in stochastic games. As a corollary to Theorem 1, we know
that a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium exists in a stochastic game with
endogenous shocks. Theorem 2 extends Theorem 1 by including an atomic part in
the transition probability, and covers the main existence result in [37] as a special
case. As an illustrative application of stochastic games with endogenous shocks,
we consider a stochastic version of the dynamic oligopoly model as studied in
[30, 31].10 Note that our results on stochastic games with endogenous shocks and
the stochastic dynamic oligopoly model cannot be covered by existing results in
the relevant literature, because the transition of the shock component in the state
explicitly depends on the parameters in the previous stage.
To study a dynamic problem with a stationary structure, the standard approach
is to work with a reduced problem with a recursive structure, in which players’
payoffs are given by a convex combination of the stage payoffs and players’ expected
continuation values in terms of the Bellman equations. To solve the existence
10Further applications will be discussed in Remark 2.
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problem for a stochastic game, one often needs to work with a one-shot auxiliary
game parameterized by state variable s and continuation value function v, in which
the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs is denoted by Pv(s). Though the correspondence
Pv(·) is closed valued and upper hemicontinuous in terms of v, it is not convex
valued in general. As a result, each of the desirable convexity, closedness and upper
hemicontinuity properties would fail for the correspondence R from the space of
continuation value functions to itself, whose value at a continuation value function
v is the collection of measurable selections of the correspondence Pv(·). Hence, the
classical Fan-Glicksberg Fixed-point Theorem (see Corollary 17.55 in [1]) is not
applicable to the correspondence R. Note that a fixed point of the correspondence
R will correspond to a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium of the stochastic
game.11 On the other hand, the convex hull correspondence co(R) of R does have
the above desirable properties. Thus, co(R) has a fixed point, which corresponds
to a stationary Markov perfect correlated equilibrium of the stochastic game as in
[10] and [40]. The key insight of our proof is that this imposed convexity restriction
can be relaxed by showing the equivalence of the conditional expectations of co(R)
and R under the condition of a decomposable coarser transition kernel, which
leads to a fixed point of the correspondence R (instead of co(R)). The minimality
of our condition for this “one-shot game” approach is also demonstrated from a
technical point of view in the sense that the conditions are shown to be tight as in
Propositions 4 and 5.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a general model
of discounted stochastic games. The main result is given in Section 3. Stochastic
games with endogenous shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model are
considered in Section 4. Section 5 provides an extension of the main existence
result by allowing the transition kernel to have an atomic part. Section 6 discusses
the relationship between our existence theorems and several related results in
the literature, and also demonstrates the minimality of our condition. Section 7
concludes the paper. The Appendix collects the proofs.
11For details, see Subsection 8.2.
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2 Discounted Stochastic Games
An m-person discounted stochastic game can be defined in terms of (1) a state
space, (2) a state-dependent feasible action correspondence for each player, (3) a
stage-payoff for each player that depends on the state and action profile, (4) a
discount factor for each player, and (5) a transition probability that depends on
the state and action profile. Formally, an m-person discounted stochastic game is
described as follows:
• I = {1, · · · ,m} is the set of players.
• (S,S) is a measurable space representing the states of nature, where S is
countably generated.12
• For each i ∈ I, Xi is player i’ action space, which is a nonempty compact
metric space endowed with its Borel σ-algebra B(Xi). Let X =
∏
1≤i≤mXi
and B(X) = ⊗1≤i≤mB(Xi). ThenX is the space of all possible action profiles.
• For each i ∈ I, the set of feasible actions of player i at state s is given
by Ai(s), where Ai is an S-measurable,
13 nonempty and compact valued
correspondence from S to Xi. Let A(s) =
∏
i∈I Ai(s) for each s ∈ S.
• For each i ∈ I, ui : S × X → R is player i’s stage-payoff with an absolute
bound C (i.e., for every i ∈ I and (s, x) ∈ S × X, |ui(s, x)| ≤ C for some
positive real number C) such that ui(s, x) is S-measurable in s for each x ∈ X
and continuous in x for each s ∈ S.
• βi ∈ [0, 1) is player i’s discount factor.
• The law of motion for the states is given by the transition probability Q :
S × X × S → [0, 1].14 That is, if s is the state at stage t and x ∈ X is
12It means that there is a countable subset D of S such that S is generated by the sets in D. This
condition is widely adopted. For example, the state spaces in [10], [11], and [27] are respectively assumed
to be a compact metric space, a Polish space, a Borel subset of a Polish space, and hence are all countably
generated.
13The correspondence Ai is said to be S-measurable (resp. weakly S-measurable) if for any closed
(resp. open) subset B of Xi, the set {s ∈ S : Ai(s) ∩B 6= ∅} belongs to S; see Definition 18.1 of [1]. In
the literature, there are some papers which assume that the correspondence Ai is weakly measurable;
see, for example, [11] and [40]. These two measurability notions coincide in our setting since Ai is
compact valued; see Lemma 18.2 in [1].
14Note that the payoff ui and the transition probability Q only need to be defined on the graph of
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the action profile chosen simultaneously by the m players at this stage, then
Q(E|s, x) is the probability that the state at stage t+1 belongs to the set E
given s and x.
1. Q(·|s, x) (abbreviated as Q(s,x)) is a probability measure on (S,S) for all
s ∈ S and x ∈ X, and for all E ∈ S, Q(E|·, ·) is S ⊗ B(X)-measurable.
2. For all s and x, Q(·|s, x) is absolutely continuous with respect to a
probability measure λ on (S,S). Let q be an S ⊗ S ⊗ B(X)-measurable
function from S × S × X to R+ such that for any s ∈ S and x ∈ X,
q(·, s, x) (also written as q(·|s, x) or q(s,x)) is the corresponding Radon-
Nikodym derivative of Q(·|s, x).15
3. For all s ∈ S, the mapping x→ Q(·|s, x) is norm continuous; that is, for
any sequence of action profiles {xn} converging to some x0, the sequence
{Q(·|s, xn)} converges to Q(·|s, x0) in total variation.16
As in [32], a history of a stochastic game up to stage t ≥ 1 can be defined as
follows. We use st and xt to describe respectively the state and action profile in
stage t. Let h1 = s1 ∈ S, ht = (s1,x1, s2, . . . ,xt−1, st) for t ≥ 2, where xj−1 ∈
A(sj−1) and sj ∈ S for 2 ≤ j ≤ t, and Ht be the space of all such ht. A strategy
fi of player i specifies, for each stage t ≥ 1, a measurable mapping (to be called
a mixed action plan at stage t) from the space Ht to the set of player i’s mixed
actionsM(Xi),
17 which places probability 1 on the set of feasible actions Ai(st) at
each state st ∈ S. For any profile of strategies f = {fi}i∈I of the players and every
initial state s1 ∈ S, a probability measure P
f
s1 is defined on (S×X)
∞ in a canonical
way; see, for example, [7]. Given the strategy profile f in the game starting from
the state s1, the expected payoff of player i is E
f
s1
(∑∞
t=1 β
t−1
i ui(st,xt)
)
, where the
A. For simplicity, we follow the literature to define them on the whole product space S ×X , as in [10],
[27], [28] and [40].
15Let (S,S, λ) be a probability space. A finite measure ν is said to be absolutely continuous with
respect to λ if for any D ∈ S, λ(D) = 0 implies ν(D) = 0. In this case, there exists a (λ-almost) unique
λ-integrable function q such that ν(D) =
∫
D
q(s)λ(ds) for any D ∈ S. Such a function q is called the
Radon-Nikodym derivative of ν with respect to λ, see p.134 in [29].
16The total variation distance of two probability measures µ and ν on (S,S) is ‖µ− ν‖
TV
=
supD∈S |µ(D)−ν(D)|. A sequence of probability measures {µn} is said to be convergent to a probability
measure µ0 in total variation if limn→∞ ‖µn − µ0‖TV = 0.
17For a Borel setD in a complete separable metric space, letM(D) be the space of all Borel probability
measures on D.
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expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure P fs1 . A strategy for a
player is called a Markov strategy if the mixed action plan specified for each stage
t ≥ 1 only depends on the state st ∈ S. As highlighted in [32], Markov strategies
have the advantage that these strategies only depend on payoff-relevant data in
the game.
In this paper, we shall focus on a particular class of Markov strategies, namely
the “stationary Markov strategies”, in which a player makes her decision based
only on the current state but not the calendar time. Namely, the mixed action
plan specified for each stage t ≥ 1 is the same mapping. Stationary Markov
strategies are natural for the discounted payoff evaluation, since subgames starting
at the same state are strategically equivalent in the sense that players have the
same payoffs in these subgames. In addition, stationary Markov strategies are
particularly useful because they are easy to analyze. Formally, a stationary Markov
strategy for player i is an S-measurable mapping fi : S →M(Xi) such that fi(s)
places probability 1 on the set Ai(s) for each s ∈ S.
18 A stationary Markov strategy
profile f is called a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if
E
f
s1
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1i ui(st,xt)
)
≥ E
(gi,f−i)
s1
(
∞∑
t=1
βt−1i ui(st,xt)
)
for any i ∈ I, s1 ∈ S and any strategy gi of player i.
In the following, we shall consider stationary Markov perfect equilibria in terms
of the recursive structure, which is much easier to work with. By standard results
in dynamic programming and stochastic games (see, for example, [8] and [40]),
this formulation is equivalent to the equilibrium notion defined above. Given
a stationary Markov strategy profile f , the continuation value v(·, f) gives an
essentially bounded S-measurable mapping from S to Rm, which is uniquely
18Since Ai is measurable, nonempty and compact valued, the correspondence Ai has a measurable
graph by Theorem 18.6 in [1]. Then by Corollary 18.27 in [1], Ai has a measurable selection. As a
result, the set of stationary Markov strategies of player i is nonempty for each i.
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determined by the following recursion
vi(s, f) =
∫
X
[
(1− βi)ui(s, x) + βi
∫
S
vi(s1, f)Q(ds1|s, x)
]
f(dx|s).19 (1)
The strategy profile f is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if the
discounted expected payoff of each player i is maximized by her strategy fi in
every state s ∈ S. It means that the continuation value v solves the following
recursive maximization problem:
vi(s, f) = max
xi∈Ai(s)
∫
X−i
[
(1− βi)ui(s, xi, x−i)
+βi
∫
S
vi(s1, f)Q(ds1|s, xi, x−i)
]
f−i(dx−i|s), (2)
where x−i and X−i have the usual meanings, and f−i(s) is the product probability
⊗j 6=ifj(s) on the product of the action spaces of all players other than player i at
the state s.
3 Main Result
In this section, we show the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria for
discounted stochastic games. In particular, we introduce the notion of “(decom-
posable) coarser transition kernel” and present our main result. Subsection 8.2
provides a simple proof via establishing a new connection between stochastic games
and conditional expectations of correspondences.
Before moving to the statement of the condition and the result, we need a
formal concept of an atom over a sub-σ-algebra. Let λ be a probability measure
on the measurable state space (S,S). Let G be a sub-σ-algebra of S. A set D ∈ S
of positive measure is said to be a G-atom if the restricted σ-algebras of G and S
to D are essentially the same. When the relevant σ-algebras are used to represent
information,20 an event D ∈ S is a G-atom simply means that given the realization
19The existence and uniqueness of the continuation value of each player follows from a standard
contraction mapping argument, see [8].
20For example, in the context of a stochastic game, S represents the total information about the state
space while G represents the information generated by the transition kernel q.
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of event D, S and G carry the same information. Formally, let GD and SD be the
respective σ-algebras {D ∩ D′ : D′ ∈ G} and {D ∩ D′ : D′ ∈ S} on D. The set
D ∈ S is said to be a G-atom21 if the strong completion of GD is SD.22
Definition 1. A discounted stochastic game is said to have a coarser transition
kernel if for some sub-σ-algebra G of S, q(·|s, x) is G-measurable for all s ∈ S and
x ∈ X, and S has no G-atom (under λ).23
A discounted stochastic game is said to have a decomposable coarser transition
kernel if for some sub-σ-algebra G of S, S has no G-atom (under λ) and for some
positive integer J , q(s1|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(s1, s, x)ρj(s1), where qj is S⊗S⊗B(X)-
jointly measurable and qj(·, s, x) is G-measurable for each s ∈ S and x ∈ X,
qj(·, s, x) and ρj are nonnegative and integrable on the atomless probability space
(S,S, λ), j = 1, . . . , J .
Note that the condition of “coarser transition kernel” is a special case of the
condition of “decomposable coarser transition kernel”.
Below, we provide a simple example to illustrate the condition of “a decompos-
able coarser transition kernel”.
Example 1. Suppose that the state space is S = [0, 1] × [0, 1] (resp. S1 = [0, 1] ×
[0, 1]) with the generic element s = (h, r) (resp. s1 = (h1, r1)), λ is the uniform
distribution on the unit square, and the space of action profiles is X ⊆ Rl. For
simplicity, the density function constructed below does not depend on x ∈ X.
Let
ρ1(s1) = h1, ρ2(s1) = r1;
q1(s1, s) =
h1 + h
2/3 + h
, q2(s1, s) =
2h1 + r
1 + r
;
q(s1|s) = q(s1, s) = q1(s1, s)ρ1(s1) + q2(s1, s)ρ2(s1).
21The notion of a G-atom has been considered in [17] and [34], see also Definition 1.3.3 in [26]. The
authors of this paper are grateful to an anonymous referee for providing these references.
22The strong completion of GD in S under λ is the set of all sets in the form E△E0, where E ∈ GD
and E0 is a λ-null set in SD, and E△E0 denotes the symmetric difference (E \ E0) ∪ (E0 \ E).
23When G is the trivial σ-algebra {S, ∅}, S has no G-atom if and only if λ is atomless. If (S,S, λ)
has an atom D ∈ S in the usual sense (namely, D is an atom over the trivial σ-algebra), then D is
automatically a G-atom for any sub-σ-algebra G of S. It also means that if S has no G-atom under λ,
then (S,S, λ) is atomless.
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It is easy to check that the integration of q(s1, s) with respect to s1 on S1 is 1 for
any s ∈ S.
Let S be the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1]× [0, 1] and G = B([0, 1])⊗{∅, [0, 1]}, where
B([0, 1]) is the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1]. For any s ∈ S, both q1(·, s) and q2(·, s)
are linear functions of h1 and do not depend on r1. Thus, the σ-algebra generated
by {q1(·, s), q2(·, s)}s∈S is G.
24 It is clear that S has no G-atom.25 As a result,
the density function q satisfies the condition of a decomposable coarser transition
kernel.
Notice that the functions {q(·, s)}s∈S are measurable with respect to the σ-
algebra S. Below, we show that S is indeed generated by the collection of functions
{q(·, s)}s∈S . The proof is left in the Appendix.
Claim 1. In Example 1, the σ-algebra generated by {q(·, s)}s∈S is S.
The measurability requirements on the action correspondences, the stage
payoffs, the transition probability and the transition kernel simply mean that
the σ-algebra S is generated by the four collections of mappings {Ai(·)}i∈I ,
{ui(·, x)}i∈I,x∈X , {Q(E|·, x)}E∈S,x∈X and {q(·|s, x)}s∈S,x∈X . When the transition
kernel is in the form q(s1|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(s1, s, x)ρj(s1), let G be the σ-
algebra generated by the mappings {qj(·|s, x)}j∈J,s∈S,x∈X . In the context of
Example 1, if one works with some S-measurable action correspondences and stage
payoffs, then the mappings {Ai(·)}i∈I , {ui(·, x)}i∈I,x∈X , {Q(E|·, x)}E∈S,x∈X and
{q(·|s, x)}s∈S,x∈X generate the σ-algebra S = B([0, 1])⊗B([0, 1]) (which is already
generated by {q(·|s, x)}s∈S,x∈X , as shown in Claim 1). On the other hand, The σ-
algebra generated by {q1(·, s), q2(·, s)}s∈S is G = B([0, 1])⊗{∅, [0, 1]}. The condition
of a decomposable coarser transition kernel is satisfied in this case because S has
no G-atom. In particular, the word “coarser” here means that the σ-algebra G
induced by {q1(·, s), q2(·, s)}s∈S is coarser than the σ-algebra S in the primitive of
the game, given any non-trivial event.
We now state the main result of this paper.
24A σ-algebra is said to be generated by a collection of mappings taking values in some complete
separable metric spaces if it is the smallest σ-algebra on which these mappings are measurable.
25For example, let D be the subset [0, 1/2]× [0, 1] of S. Then, the set [0, 1/2]× [1/2, 1] is in SD but
not in GD, which means that D is not a G-atom.
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Theorem 1. Every discounted stochastic game with a (decomposable) coarser
transition kernel has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
4 Applications
In this section, we shall present some applications. In particular, we introduce
in Subsection 4.1 a subclass of stochastic games with a decomposable coarser
transition kernel, where the discrete components in the actions and states could
directly influence the transition of the random shocks. Games in this subclass are
called stochastic games with endogenous shocks.26 As an illustrative application,
we shall consider in Subsection 4.2 a stochastic version of a dynamic oligopoly
model as studied in [30, 31].
4.1 Stochastic games with endogenous shocks
Economic models with both discrete and continuous components of actions are
common. For example, firms make discrete choices like entry or exit of the market,
and continuous choices like quantities and prices of the products. Here we shall
consider stochastic games where the discrete choices may play a distinct role. For
this purpose, we assume that for each player i ∈ I, her action space has two
components in the form Xi = X
d
i ×X
−
i , where X
d
i is a finite set representing the
discrete choices, and X−i is a compact metric space representing possibly other
types of actions. Let Xd =
∏
i∈I X
d
i and X
− =
∏
i∈I X
−
i .
Since actions in the previous period could be part of the current state, the state
space may have discrete and continuous components as well. On the other hand,
random shocks form a common feature in various economic models. As a result,
we assume that the state space has the form S = Hd ×H− × R. Here R models
the random shocks. The components Hd and H− represent respectively a finite
set of fundamental parameters and the residual part of fundamental parameters in
the states.
As defined in Section 2, the state transition in a stochastic game generally
26As in [11], we also allow the random shocks to enter into the stage payoffs of the players.
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depends on the actions and state in the previous period. However, as shown by
the counterexample in [28], a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in a stochastic
game may not exist without restriction on the transition kernel. Indeed the
restriction, as considered in [10], [11] and [40], is to assume that the transition
of random shocks in the stochastic games does not depend on the actions and
state in the previous period explicitly. For a stochastic game whose state space
is in the form S = Hd × H− × R, our innovation is to allow that the transition
of random shocks directly depends on the discrete components Hd and Xd of the
state and actions from the previous period.
We shall now describe formally the state space and the law of motion in a
stochastic game with endogenous shocks with the rest of parameters and conditions
as in Section 2.
1. The state space can be written as S = Hd×H−×R and S = Hd⊗H−⊗R,
where Hd is a finite set with its power set Hd, H− and R are complete
separable metric spaces endowed with the Borel σ-algebras H− and R
respectively. Denote H = Hd ×H− and H = Hd ⊗H−.
2. Recall that Q : S × X × S → [0, 1] is the transition probability. For
s ∈ S, x ∈ X, let QH(·|s, x) be the marginal of Q(·|s, x) on H. There is
a fixed probability measure κ on (H,H) such that for all s and x, QH(·|s, x)
is absolutely continuous with respect to κ with the corresponding product
measurable Radon-Nikodym derivative φ(·|s, x). For each s ∈ S, QH(·|s, x)
is norm continuous in x.
3. The distribution of r′ ∈ R in the current period depends on h′ ∈ H in the
current period as well as hd and xd in the previous period. In particular,
QR : H
d ×Xd ×H × R → [0, 1] is a transition probability such that for all
s = (hd, h−, r), x = (xd, x−), and Z ∈ S, we have
Q(Z|s, x) =
∫
H
∫
R
1Z(h
′, r′)QR(dr
′|hd, xd, h′)QH(dh
′|s, x).27
27For any set A, the indicator function 1A of A is a function such that 1A(y) is 1 if y ∈ A and 0
otherwise.
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4. For any hd, xd and h′, QR(·|h
d, xd, h′) is absolutely continuous with respect to
an atomless probability measure ν on (R,R) with the corresponding product
measurable Radon-Nikodym derivative ψ(·|hd, xd, h′).
Remark 1. A noisy stochastic game as considered in [11] is the case that Hd and
Xd are singletons. When both H− and X− are singletons, the random shocks in
the current period could fully depend on the action profile and the fundamental part
of the state in the previous period since QR could fully depend on (h
d, xd) in the
previous period; see, for example, the stochastic dynamic oligopoly model in the
next subsection. Remark 2 below considers possible applications in which Hd, Xd,
H− and X− are all non-singletons.28
The following result is a simple corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. A stochastic game with endogenous shocks has a decomposable
coarser transition kernel, and hence possesses a stationary Markov perfect equi-
librium.
Proof. Let λ = κ⊗ ν, and G = H⊗ {∅, R}. Since ν is atomless, S has no G-atom
under λ. It is clear that for all s = (hd, h−, r), x = (xd, x−), and Z ∈ S, we have
Q(Z|s, x) =
∫
H×R
1Z(h
′, r′)φ(h′|s, x) · ψ(r′|hd, xd, h′)λ(d(h′, r′)), 29
which means that the corresponding transition kernel
q(s′|s, x) = φ(h′|s, x) · ψ(r′|hd, xd, h′)
for s′ = (h′, r′).
For any fixed x˜d ∈ Xd and h˜d ∈ Hd, define an S ⊗ S ⊗ B(X)-measurable
function φˆ(h˜d,x˜d) on S × S ×X and an S-measurable function ψˆ(h˜d,x˜d) on S such
28Given a stochastic game with endogenous shocks G, one may define an auxiliary (noisy) stochastic
game G′ with a new state space S′, where S′ expands the state space S of G by including an additional
component consisting of (hd, xd) from the previous period. The main theorem in [11] implies the
existence of a stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium in this auxiliary stochastic game G′. However,
such an equilibrium strategy for G′ is not a stationary Markov Perfect equilibrium for G because it
depends on (hd, xd) from the previous period in the original game (hence not a Markov strategy for G).
29For clarity and notational simplicity, we use s, (h, r), and (hd, h−, r) interchangably (similarly for
their “prime” versions).
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that for any s′ = (h′, r′) ∈ S, s = (hd, h−, r) ∈ S and x = (xd, x−) ∈ X,
• φˆ(h˜d,x˜d)(s
′, s, x) = φ(h′|s, x) · 1{(h˜d,x˜d)}
(
(hd, xd)
)
;
• ψˆ(h˜d,x˜d)(s
′) = ψ(r′|h˜d, x˜d, h′).
It is clear that φˆ(h˜d,x˜d)(·, s, x) is G-measurable for any fixed s and x. Then we have
q(s′|s, x) = φ(h′|s, x) · ψ(r′|h′, hd, xd) =
∑
h˜d∈Hd,x˜d∈Xd
φˆ(h˜d,x˜d)(s
′, s, x) · ψˆ(h˜d,x˜d)(s
′).
Since Hd and Xd are both finite, the stochastic game with endogenous shocks
has a decomposable coarser transition kernel, and a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium by Theorem 1.
4.2 Stochastic dynamic oligopoly with price competi-
tion
As mentioned in the previous subsection, it is natural to model certain economic
situations as stochastic games with endogenous shocks. In this subsection, we shall
consider a stochastic analog of a dynamic oligopoly asynchronous choice model as
studied in [30, 31]. We verify that such a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model is
actually a stochastic game with endogenous shocks. Corollary 1 then allows us to
claim the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Competition between two firms (i = 1, 2) takes place in discrete time with an
infinite horizon. Each period begins with a set of firms active in the market, a
vector of prices from the previous period, and a demand shock. An active firm
will make the price decision while an inactive firm follows its price in the previous
period. The firms’ profits depend on the prices of both firms and the demand shock.
This model is an extension of the model as considered in [31], where firms move
alternatively. In contrast, we allow for any possible transition between inactive
and active firms, and introduce endogenous demand shocks which is considered
desirable in [31, p. 587].
Formally, the set of players is I = {1, 2}. An element θ in the set Θ = {θ1, θ2, θ3}
indicates which players are active at the beginning of each period. Player 1 (resp.
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player 2) is active if θ = θ1 (resp. θ2); both players are active if θ = θ3. That
is, instead of focusing on a fixed short commitment for two periods, we allow for
random commitments (see [30] for more discussion). As in the model of [31, p. 573],
the price space P1 = P2 = P is assumed to be finite, which means that firms cannot
set prices in units smaller than, say, a penny. Let P˜ = P , and P˜ 2 = P˜ × P˜ denote
the set of prices from the previous period. Let R be a set of demand shocks,
which is a closed subset of the Euclidean space Rl. The state of the market is then
summarized by a vector (θ, (p˜1, p˜2), r).
A decision of firm i is to propose a price ai ∈ Pi. At state (θ, (p˜1, p˜2), r), the
set of feasible actions for firm i is Pi if θ = θi or θ3, and {p˜i} otherwise. If a firm is
active, then it can pick any price in Pi. If the firm is inactive, then it must commit
to its price from the previous period.
Given the state s = (θ, (p˜1, p˜2), r) and action profile (p1, p2) in the previous
period, the state in the current period, denoted by (θ′, (p˜1
′, p˜2
′), r′), is determined
as follows:
1. θ′ is determined by s and (p1, p2), following a transition probability κ1(·|s, p1, p2);
2. p˜i
′ = pi for i = 1, 2, which means that the action profile in the previous period
is publicly observed and viewed as part of the state in the current period;
3. r′ is determined by an atomless transition probability µ(·|θ′, p1, p2, θ, p˜1, p˜2),
which means that demand shocks are directly determined by the prices and
firms’ relative positions in the previous and current periods.
Suppose that the market demand function D : P × R → R+ and the cost
function c : R → R+ are both bounded. At the state s = (θ, (p˜1, p˜2), r), firm i’s
profit is given by
ui(p1, p2, r) =


(pi − c(r))D(pi, r) pi < pj;
(pi−c(r))D(pi,r)
2 pi = pj;
0 pi > pj.
where (p1, p2) is the action profile in the current period. Firm i discounts the
future by a discount factor 0 < βi < 1.
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We shall show that this stochastic dynamic duopoly model can be viewed as
a stochastic game with endogenous shocks. For both firms, Xdi = Pi and X
−
i
is a set with only one element. Let Hd = Θ × P˜ 2, H− be a singleton set, and
H = Hd ×H−. Let κ be the counting probability measure on H and
ν =
1
J
∑
(θ,θ′)∈Θ2,(p1,p2)∈P1×P2,(p˜1,p˜2)∈P˜ 2
µ(·|θ′, p1, p2, θ, p˜1, p˜2),
where J is cardinality of the product space Θ2 × P 4. Then the marginal measure
QH(·|s, p1, p2) is absolutely continuous with respect to κ, and QR(·|h
′, hd, p1, p2) =
µ(·|θ′, p1, p2, θ, p˜1, p˜2) is absolutely continuous with respect to ν. Since the space
of action profiles is finite, the continuity requirement on the payoff functions and
transition kernel is automatically satisfied. Therefore, the following proposition
follows from Corollary 1.
Proposition 1. The above dynamic duopoly model has a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium.
Remark 2. In the above model, the position of a firm (active or inactive) is
randomly determined, and hence is not a choice variable. One can consider a
dynamic market model in which the positions of the firms are determined by the
endogenous entry/exit decisions; see, for example, [11], [13] and [20]. In particular,
in the application on firm entry, exit, and investment in [11], each firm needs to
make decisions on entry/exit as well as on the production plan. Thus, the action
space naturally has two components. The state space can be divided as a product
of three parts: the first part Z provides a list of firms which are present or absent
in the market in the current period; the second part K is the available capital stock
in the current period; and the last part R represents exogenously given random
shocks which are i.i.d with a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. This
was formulated in [11] as a noisy stochastic game, which can also be viewed as a
stochastic game with endogenous shocks with Hd as a singleton set and H− = Z×
K. This model can be extended by letting Hd = Z, H− = K, and the transition of
R depend on firms’ positions in the previous and current periods. Such dependence
of the random shocks allows for the interpretation that the change in the number
19
of active firms as well as the shift of market positions by some firms30 do matter
for the demand/supply shocks. For example, the decision of a big firm to quit the
market is a shock that could significantly distort the expectation of the demand
side, while the exit decision of a small firm may not even be noticed. The extended
model remains a stochastic game with endogenous shocks, which has a stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium.31
5 An Extension
In Section 3, we assume that the probability measure λ is atomless on (S,S).
Below, we consider the more general case that λ may have atoms. To guarantee
the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, we still assume the condition
of decomposable coarser transition kernel, but only on the atomless part.
1. There exist disjoint S-measurable subsets Sa and Sl such that Sa ∪ Sl = S,
λ|Sa is the atomless part of λ while λ|Sl is the purely atomic part of λ. The
subset Sl is countable and each singleton {sl} with sl ∈ Sl is S-measurable
with λ(sl) > 0.
32
2. For sa ∈ Sa, the transition kernel q(sa|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(sa, s, x)ρj(sa) for
some positive integer J , and for each s ∈ S and x ∈ X, where qj is product
measurable, and qj(·, s, x) and ρj are nonnegative and integrable on the
atomless measure space (Sa,S
Sa , λ|Sa) for j = 1, . . . , J .
33
Definition 2. Let G be a sub-σ-algebra of SSa . A discounted stochastic game
is said to have a decomposable coarser transition kernel on the atomless
30If 1 and 0 represent active or inactive firms respectively, then a shift of market position for the
active (inactive) firm means to change its position from 1 to 0 (0 to 1).
31As noted in the introduction, our existence results on stochastic games, whose state transition for
the shock component explicitly depends on the parameters in the previous stage, cannot be covered by
earlier results. These include Corollary 1, Proposition 1 as well as the results suggested in Remark 2.
32This assumption is only for simplicity. It is immediate to extend our result to the case that Sl is a
collection of at most countably many atoms in the usual measure-theoretic sense. Note that for a set
{s} with one element in S, we use λ(s) to denote the measure of this set instead of λ({s}).
33It is clear that for any E ∈ S, the transition probability Q(E|s, x) =
∫
E∩Sa
q(sa|s, x)λ(dsa) +∑
sl∈Sl
1E(sl)q(sl|s, x)λ(sl) for any s ∈ S and x ∈ X .
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part if SSa has no G-atom under λ|Sa and qj(·, s, x) is G-measurable on Sa for
each s ∈ S and x ∈ X, j = 1, . . . , J .
The following theorem shows that the equilibrium existence result still holds.
Theorem 2. Every discounted stochastic game with a decomposable coarser
transition kernel on the atomless part has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
6 Discussion
In this section, we shall discuss the relationship between our results and several
related results. In particular, we show that our results cover the existence
results on correlated equilibria, noisy stochastic games, stochastic games with
state-independent transitions, and stochastic games with mixtures of constant
transition kernels as special cases. We also explicitly demonstrate why a recent
counterexample fails to satisfy our conditions, and discuss the minimality of our
conditions.
Correlated equilibria
It was proved in [40] that a stationary Markov perfect correlated equilibrium
exists in discounted stochastic games in the setup described in our Section 2.
Ergodic properties of such correlated equilibria were obtained in [10] under stronger
conditions. They essentially assumed that players can observe the outcome of a
public randomization device before making decisions at each stage.34 Thus, the
new state space can be regarded as S′ = S×L endowed with the product σ-algebra
S ′ = S ⊗B and product measure λ′ = λ⊗ η, where L is the unit interval endowed
with the Borel σ-algebra B and Lebesgue measure η. Denote G′ = S⊗{∅, L}. Given
s′, s′1 ∈ S
′ and x ∈ X, the new transition kernel q′(s′1|s
′, x) = q(s1|s, x), where s
(resp. s1) is the projection of s
′ (resp. s′1) on S and q is the original transition
kernel with the state space S. Thus, q′(·|s′, x) is measurable with respect to G′ for
any s′ ∈ S′ and x ∈ X. It is obvious from Lemma 2 in [18] that S ′ has no G′-atom.
34For detailed discussions on such a public randomization device, or “sunspot”, see [10] and their
references.
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Then the condition of coarser transition kernel is satisfied for the extended state
space (S′,S ′, λ′), and the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
follows from Theorem 1.35 The drawback of this approach is that the “sunspot”
is irrelevant to the fundamental parameters of the game. Our result shows that it
can indeed enter the stage payoff u, the correspondence of feasible actions A and
the transition probability Q.
Stochastic games with finite actions and state-independent transi-
tions
In [42], they studied stochastic games with finite actions and state-independent
atomless transitions. Namely, Xi is finite for each i ∈ I and the transition
probability Q does not directly depend on s (to be denoted by Q(·|x)). Let card(X)
be the cardinality of the finite set X of action profiles. We shall check that such a
stochastic game satisfies the condition of decomposable coarser transition kernels.
Let λ be the probability measure 1
card(X)
∑
x∈X Q(·|x). Then, for each x, Q(·|x)
is absolutely continuous with respect to λ, and the corresponding Radon-Nikodym
derivative is denoted by q(·|x) (abbreviated as qx). For a fixed x ∈ X, let 1{x}
be the indicator function of the singleton set {x}: 1{x}(y) = 1 if y = x, and 0
otherwise. Then we have
q(s′|x) =
∑
y∈X
1{x}(y)qy(s
′).
It is obvious that the condition of decomposable coarser transition kernels is
satisfied with G = {∅, S}. Then a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium exists
by Theorem 1.
Decomposable constant transition kernels on the atomless part
Stochastic games with transition probabilities as combinations of finitely many
measures on the atomless part were considered in [37]. In particular, the structure
of the transition probability in [37] is as follows.
35As noted in [40], a stochastic version of Caratheodory’s theorem implies that one can find a
stationary Markov correlated equilibrium strategy as a stochastic convex combination of stationary
Markov strategies.
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1. S2 is a countable subset of S and S1 = S\S2, each point in S2 is S-measurable.
2. There are atomless nonnegative measures µj concentrated on S1, nonnegative
measures δk concentrated on S2, and measurable functions qj, bk : S ×
X → [0, 1], 1 ≤ j ≤ J and 1 ≤ k ≤ K, where J and K are positive
integers. The transition probability Q(·|s, x) = δ(·|s, x) + Q′(·|s, x) for each
s ∈ S and x ∈ X, where δ(·|s, x) =
∑
1≤k≤K bk(s, x)δk(·) and Q
′(·|s, x) =∑
1≤j≤J qj(s, x)µj(·).
3. For any j and k, qj(s, ·) and bk(s, ·) are continuous on X for any s ∈ S.
We shall show that any stochastic game with the above structure satisfies the
condition of decomposable coarser transition kernel on the atomless part.
Without loss of generality, assume that µj and δk are all probability measures.
Let λ(E) = 1
J+K
(∑
1≤j≤J µj(E) +
∑
1≤k≤K δk(E)
)
for any E ∈ S. Then µj is
absolutely continuous with respect to λ and assume that ρj is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative for 1 ≤ j ≤ J .
Given any s ∈ S and x ∈ X, let
q(s′|s, x) =


∑
1≤j≤J qj(s, x)ρj(s
′), if s′ ∈ S1;
δ(s′|s,x)
λ(s′) , if s
′ ∈ S2 and λ(s
′) > 0;
0, if s′ ∈ S2 and λ(s
′) = 0.
Then Q(·|s, x) is absolutely continuous with respect to λ and q(·|s, x) is the
transition kernel. The condition of a decomposable coarser transition kernel on
the atomless part is satisfied with G = {∅, S1}. Then a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium exists by Theorem 2.
Noisy stochastic games
It was proved in [11] that stationary Markov perfect equilibria exist in stochastic
games with noise – a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed and
not directly affected by the previous period’s state and actions. As indicated in
Remark 1, a noisy stochastic game is a special case of a stochastic game with
endogenous shocks such that Hd and Xd are both singletons.
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By Corollary 1, a noisy stochastic games has a decomposable coarser transition
kernel. Below, we directly show that any noisy stochastic game indeed has a coarser
transition kernel. The existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in noisy
stochastic games thus follows from Theorem 1. The proof of the proposition below
is left in the appendix.
Proposition 2. Every noisy stochastic game has a coarser transition kernel.
Nonexistence of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium
A concrete example of a stochastic game satisfying all the conditions as stated
in Section 2 was presented in [28], which has no stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium. Their example will be described in the following.
1. The set of players is {A,B,C,C ′,D,D′, E, F}.
2. Player A has the action space {U,D}, and player B has the action space
{L,M,R}. Players C,C ′,D,D′ have the same action space {0, 1}. Players
E, F have the action space {−1, 1}.
3. The state space is S = [0, 1] endowed with the Borel σ-algebra B.
4. For any action profile x, let
h(x) = xC + xC′ + xD + xD′ ,
where xi is the action of player i. For each s ∈ [0, 1], let
Q˜(s, x) = (1− s) ·
1
64
h(x),
and U(s, 1) be the uniform distribution on [s, 1] for s ∈ [0, 1). The transition
probability is given by
Q(s, x) = Q˜(s, x)U(s, 1) + (1− Q˜(s, x))δ1,
where δ1 is the Dirac measure at 1.
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The following proposition shows that the condition of a decomposable coarser
transition kernel on the atomless part is violated in this example.36
Proposition 3. The atomless part Q˜(s, x)U(s, 1) of the transition probability in
the Example of [28] does not have a decomposable coarser transition kernel.
The proof will be given in Subsection 8.5. Here we provide some intuition
why the decomposable coarser transition kernel condition fails in this example.
Suppose that the atomless part Q˜(s, x)U(s, 1) (s ∈ [0, 1)) of the transition
probability satisfies the condition with respect to the Lebesgue measure η on
[0, 1). The Radon-Nikodym derivative of U(s, 1) with respect to η on [0, 1) is:
q(s1|s) =


1
1−s s1 ∈ [s, 1),
0 s1 ∈ [0, s).
Given the particular form of Q˜(s, x), we can claim
that for some positive integer J , q(·|s) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(·, s)ρj(·) for any s ∈ [0, 1),
where qj is product measurable, qj(·, s) and ρj(·) are nonnegative and η-integrable.
Moreover, for some sub-σ-algebra G of the Borel σ-algebra S˜ on [0, 1), qj(·, s)
is G-measurable for each j, s, and S˜ has no G-atom. Consider the simple case
that ρj is strictly positive on [0, 1) for all j. For any fixed s ∈ [0, 1), let
Ds = {s1 ∈ [0, 1) : qj(s1, s) = 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , J}, which is G-measurable. If
s1 ∈ [0, s), then q(s1|s) = 0, which implies that qj(s1, s) = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ J ;
hence s1 ∈ Ds. If s1 ∈ [s, 1), then q(s1|s) =
1
1−s , which implies that qj(s1, s) 6= 0
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ J ; hence s1 /∈ Ds. Therefore, Ds = [0, s) is in G. By the arbitrary
choice of s ∈ [0, 1), we know that G is the same as S˜ which is generated by the
class of intervals {[0, s)}s∈[0,1). It means that S˜ has a G-atom [0, 1), which is a
contradiction.
Minimality
We have shown the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
discounted stochastic games by assuming the presence of a (decomposable) coarser
transition kernel. This raises the question of whether our condition is minimal and,
if so, then in what sense.
36Proposition 3 can also be implied by the nonexistence result in [28] and our Theorem 2. However,
the argument in [28] is deep, and our proof explicitly demonstrates why their example fails to satisfy
our sufficient condition in Theorem 2.
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As discussed in the introduction, the main difficulty in the existence argument
for stochastic games is due to the failure of the convexity of the equilibrium
payoff correspondence P of a one-shot auxiliary game as parameterized by state
s and continuation value function v. As will be shown in Subsection 8.2,
the correspondence R(v), which is the collection of selections from the equi-
librium payoff correspondence P (v, ·), will live in an infinite-dimensional space
if there is a continuum of states. Thus, the desirable closedness and upper
hemicontinuity properties would fail even though P has these properties in
terms of v. To handle such issues, the standard approach is to work with
the convex hull co(R). We bypass this imposed convexity restriction by using
the result that for any S-measurable, integrably bounded37 and closed valued
correspondence G, if S has no G-atom, then I
(S,G,λ)
G = I
(S,G,λ)
co(G) , where I
(S,G,λ)
G =
{Eλ(g|G) : g is an S-measurable selection of G} (I
(S,G,λ)
co(G) is defined analogously)
and the conditional expectation is taken with respect to λ. Moreover, for
the condition of a decomposable coarser transition kernel, we assume that
the transition kernel can be divided into finitely many parts. The following
propositions demonstrate the minimality of our condition from a technical point
of view.
Proposition 4. Suppose that (S,S, λ) has a G-atom D with λ(D) > 0. Then there
exists a measurable correspondence G from (S,S, λ) to {0, 1} such that I
(S,G,λ)
G 6=
I
(S,G,λ)
co(G) .
The key result that we need in the proof of Theorem 1 in Subsection 8.2 is
the existence of an S-measurable selection v∗ of a correspondence G such that
E
λ(v∗ρj|G) = E
λ(v′ρj|G) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J , where v
′ is an S-measurable selection
of co(G), and {ρj}1≤j≤J are the functions as in Definition 1 for a decomposable
coarser transition kernel. The question is whether a similar result holds if we
generalize the condition of a decomposable coarser transition kernel from a finite
sum to a countable sum. We will show that this is not possible.
Let (S,S, λ) be the Lebesgue unit interval (L,B, η). Suppose that {̺n}n ≥0 is
37A correspondence G : (S,S, λ)→ Rn is said to be integrably bounded if there exists some integrable
function ϕ : (S,S, λ)→ R+ such that ‖G(s)‖ ≤ ϕ(s) for λ-almost all s, where ‖ · ‖ is usual norm on Rn.
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a complete orthogonal system in L2(S,S, λ) such that ̺n takes value in {−1, 1}
and
∫
S
̺n dλ = 0 for each n ≥ 1 and ̺0 ≡ 1. Let ρn = ̺n + 1 for each n ≥ 1 and
ρ0 = ̺0. Let {En}n≥0 be a countable measurable partition of S, En nonempty and
qn(s) = 1En for each n ≥ 0. Suppose that a transition kernel q is decomposed into
a countable sum q(s1|s, x) =
∑
n≥0 qn(s)ρn(s1). The following proposition shows
that the argument for the case that J is finite is not valid for such an extension.38
Proposition 5. Let G(s) = {−1, 1} for s ∈ S, and f be the measurable selection
of co(G) that takes the constant value 0. Then, for any sub-σ-algebra F ⊆ S, there
is no S-measurable selection g of G with Eλ(gρn|F) = E
λ(fρn|F) for any n ≥ 0.
Thus, our condition is minimal in the sense that if one would like to adopt
the “one-shot game” approach as used in the literature for obtaining a stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium, then it is a tight condition.
7 Concluding Remarks
We consider stationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games
with a general state space. So far, such equilibria have been shown to exist only
for several special classes of stochastic games. In this paper, the existence of
stationary Markov perfect equilibria is proved under some general conditions, which
broadens the scope of potential applications of stochastic games. We illustrate
such applications via two examples, namely, stochastic games with endogenous
shocks and a stochastic dynamic oligopoly model. Our results unify and go beyond
various existence results as in [10], [11], [37], [40] and [42], and also provide some
explanation for a recent counterexample which fails to have an equilibrium in
stationary strategies.
In the literature, the standard recursive approach for the existence arguments
is to work with a one-shot auxiliary game parameterized by the state and the
continuation value function. We adopt this approach and provide a very simple
proof under the condition of “(decomposable) coarser transition kernels”. The
proof is based on a new connection between stochastic games and conditional
38It is a variant of a well known example of Lyapunov.
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expectations of correspondences. We demonstrate from a technical point of view
that our condition is minimal for the standard “one-shot game” approach.
8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Claim 1
Let F be the sub-σ-algebra of S that is generated by the collection of functions
{q(·, s)}s∈S . Let (hˆ, rˆ) = (0, 0) (resp. (h˜, r˜) = (
1
3 , 0)), and denote qˆ (resp. q˜) as
the corresponding value of q(s1, hˆ, rˆ) (resp. q(s1, h˜, r˜)). Then both qˆ and q˜ are
functions of s1 and F-measurable. We have the following system of equations:
qˆ =
3
2
h21 + 2h1r1, (3)
q˜ = h21 +
1
3
h1 + 2h1r1. (4)
We can view h1 and r1 as two functions of (qˆ, q˜). By subtracting Equation (4) from
Equation (3), we get qˆ− q˜ = 12h
2
1−
1
3h1. By the definition, this equation must have
solutions in terms of h1 for the given value qˆ − q˜. Thus, we have
1
9 + 2(qˆ − q˜) ≥ 0,
and h1 =
1
3 +
√
1
9 + 2(qˆ − q˜) or
1
3 −
√
1
9 + 2(qˆ − q˜), with at least one of them in
[0, 1]. We can denote
αˆ(qˆ, q˜) =


1
3 +
√
1
9 + 2(qˆ − q˜), if
1
3 +
√
1
9 + 2(qˆ − q˜) ∈ [0, 1];
1
3 −
√
1
9 + 2(qˆ − q˜), otherwise.
By substituting h1 = αˆ(qˆ, q˜) into Equation (3), we can solve r1 as a function of
(qˆ, q˜), which is denoted by r1 = α˜(qˆ, q˜).
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Let πh and πr be the projection mappings on S1 with πh(h1, r1) = h1 and
πh(h1, r1) = r1 respectively. Because both qˆ and q˜ are F-measurable functions
on S1, and πh = αˆ(qˆ, q˜) and πr = α˜(qˆ, q˜), the mappings πh and πr are also F-
measurable. As a result, both B([0, 1]) ⊗ {∅, [0, 1]} and {∅, [0, 1]} ⊗ B([0, 1]) are
contained in F . Thus, S ⊆ F . Since F ⊆ S by the definition of F , we have F = S.
39By the construction, both αˆ and α˜ are obviously Borel measurable functions.
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8.2 Proof of Theorem 1
In this subsection, we shall prove Theorem 1.
Let L1((S,S, λ),R
m) and L∞((S,S, λ),R
m) be the L1 and L∞ spaces of all
S-measurable mappings from S to Rm with the usual norm; that is,
L1((S,S, λ),R
m) = {f : f is S-measurable and
∫
S
‖f‖dλ <∞},
L∞((S,S, λ),R
m) = {f : f is S-measurable and essentially bounded under λ},
where ‖ · ‖ is the usual norm in Rm. By the Riesz representation the-
orem (see Theorem 13.28 of [1]), L∞((S,S, λ),R
m) can be viewed as the
dual space of L1((S,S, λ),R
m). Then L∞((S,S, λ),R
m) is a locally convex,
Hausdorff topological vector space under the weak∗ topology. Let V = {v ∈
L∞((S,S, λ),R
m) : ‖v‖∞ ≤ C}, where C is the upper bound of the stage payoff
function u and ‖ · ‖∞ is the essential sup norm of L∞((S,S, λ),R
m). Then V
is nonempty and convex. Moreover, V is compact under the weak∗ topology by
Alaoglu’s Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of [1]). Since S is countably generated,
L1((S,S, λ),R
m) is separable, which implies that V is metrizable in the weak∗
topology (see Theorem 6.30 of [1]).
Given any v = (v1, · · · , vm) ∈ V and s ∈ S, we consider the game Γ(v, s). The
action space for player i is Ai(s). The payoff of player i with the action profile
x ∈ A(s) is given by
Ui(s, x)(v) = (1− βi)ui(s, x) + βi
∫
S
vi(s1)Q(ds1|s, x). (5)
A mixed strategy of player i is an element in M(Ai(s)), and a mixed strategy
profile is an element in
⊗
i∈IM(Ai(s)). The set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria
of the static game Γ(v, s), denoted by N(v, s), is a nonempty compact subset of⊗
i∈IM(Xi) under the weak
∗ topology due to the Fan-Glicksberg Theorem (see
[16] and Corollary 17.55 in [1]). Let P (v, s) be the set of payoff vectors induced
by the Nash equilibria in N(v, s), and co(P ) the convex hull of P . Then co(P )
is a correspondence from V × S to Rm. Let R(v) (resp. co(R(v))) be the set of
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λ-equivalence classes of S-measurable selections of P (v, ·) (resp. co(P (v, ·))) for
each v ∈ V .
Following the arguments in Lemmas 6 and 7 in [40] (see also [33]),40 for each
v ∈ V , P (v, ·) (abbreviated as Pv(·)) is S-measurable and compact valued, and
co(R(v)) is nonempty, convex, weak∗ compact valued and upper hemicontinuous.
Then the correspondence co(R) : V → V maps the nonempty, convex, weak∗
compact set V (a subset of a locally convex Hausdorff topological vector space) to
nonempty, convex subsets of V , and it has a closed graph in the weak∗ topology.
By the classical Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem, there is a fixed point v′ ∈ V
such that v′ ∈ co(R)(v′). That is, v′ is an S-measurable selection of co(P (v′, ·)).
Recall that a correspondence G : S → Rn is said to be integrably bounded
if there exists some integrable function ϕ such that ‖G(s)‖ ≤ ϕ(s) for λ-almost
all s. In addition, for any integrably bounded correspondence G from S to Rm,
I
(S,G,λ)
G = {E
λ(g|G) : g is an S-measurable selection of G}, where the conditional
expectation is taken with respect to λ.
The following lemma is from [12, Theorem 1.2].
Lemma 1. If S has no G-atom,41 then for any S-measurable,42 λ-integrably
bounded, closed valued correspondence G, I
(S,G,λ)
G = I
(S,G,λ)
co(G) .
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. Given v′, let
H(s) = {(a, a · ρ1(s), . . . , a · ρJ(s)) : a ∈ Pv′(s)},
and co(H(s)) the convex hull of H(s) for each s ∈ S. It is clear that H is S-
measurable, λ-integrably bounded and closed valued. Then I
(S,G,λ)
H = I
(S,G,λ)
co(H) by
40In [40], a slightly stronger condition was imposed on the transition probability Q that the mapping
q(·|s, x) satisfies the L1 continuity condition in x for all s ∈ S. Their arguments on the convexity,
compactness and upper hemicontinuity properties still hold in our setting.
41In [12], a set D ∈ S is said to be a G-atom if λ(D) > 0 and given any D0 ∈ SD, λ
(
s ∈ S : 0 <
λ(D0 | G)(s) < λ(D | G)(s)
)
= 0. The conditions that S has no G-atom as in [12] as well as in our paper
and the book [26] are equivalent; see Lemma 2 in [18].
42In [12], the correspondence G is said to be measurable if for any x ∈ Rm, the function d(x,G(s))
is measurable, where d is he usual metric in the Euclidean space. Their notion of measurability of a
correspondence coincides with our definition of the measurability of a correspondence, see Theorem 18.5
in [1].
30
Lemma 1, which implies that there exists an S-measurable selection v∗ of Pv′ such
that Eλ(v∗ρj |G) = E
λ(v′ρj|G) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J . For each i ∈ I, s ∈ S and x ∈ X,
we have
∫
S
v∗i (s1)Q(ds1|s, x) =
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
v∗i (s1)qj(s1, s, x)ρj(s1)λ(ds1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
E
λ(v∗i ρjqj(·, s, x)|G)(s1)λ(ds1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
E
λ(v∗i ρj |G)(s1)qj(s1, s, x)λ(ds1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
E
λ(v′iρj|G)(s1)qj(s1, s, x)λ(ds1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
E
λ(v′iρjqj(·, s, x)|G)(s1)λ(ds1)
=
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
S
v′i(s1)qj(s1, s, x)ρj(s1)λ(ds1)
=
∫
S
v′i(s1)Q(ds1|s, x).
By Equation (5), Γ(v∗, s) = Γ(v′, s) for any s ∈ S, and hence P (v∗, s) = P (v′, s).
Thus, v∗ is an S-measurable selection of Pv∗ .
By the definition of Pv∗ , these exists an S-measurable mapping f
∗ from S to⊗
i∈IM(Xi) such that f
∗(s) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game
Γ(v∗, s) and v∗(s) is the corresponding equilibrium payoff for each s ∈ S.43 It is
clear that Equations (1) and (2) hold for v∗ and f∗, which implies that f∗ is a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Let Va be the set of λ-equivalence classes of S-measurable mappings from Sa to
R
m bounded by C. For each i ∈ I, let Fi be the set of all fi : Sl → M(Xi) such
that fi(s)
(
Ai(s)
)
= 1 for all s ∈ Sl, F =
∏
i∈I Fi. Let Vl be the set of mappings
from Sl to R
m bounded by C, which is endowed with the supremum metric and
43Note that v∗ is indeed the corresponding equilibrium payoff for λ-almost all s ∈ S. However, one
can modify v∗ on a null set such that the claim holds for all s ∈ S; see, for example, [40].
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hence a complete metric space.
Given s ∈ S, va ∈ Va and v
l ∈ Vl, consider the game Γ(v
a, vl, s). The action
space for player i is Ai(s). The payoff of player i with the action profile x ∈ A(s)
is given by
Φi(s, x, v
a, vl) = (1− βi)ui(s, x) + βi
∑
1≤j≤J
∫
Sa
vai (sa)qj(sa|s, x)ρj(sa)λ(dsa)
+βi
∑
sl∈Sl
vli(sl)q(sl|s, x)λ(sl). (6)
The set of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in the game Γ(va, vl, s) is denoted as
N(va, vl, s). Let P (va, vl, s) be the set of payoff vectors induced by the Nash
equilibria in N(va, vl, s), and co(P ) the convex hull of P .
Given va ∈ Va, f ∈ F , define a mapping Π from Vl to Vl such that for each
i ∈ I, vl ∈ Vl and sl ∈ Sl,
Πi(v
a, f−i)(v
l)(sl) = max
φi∈Fi
∫
X−i
∫
Xi
Φi(sl, xi, x−i, v
a, vl)φi(dxi|sl)f−i(dx−i|sl). (7)
Let β = max{βi : i ∈ I}. Then for any v
a ∈ Va, v
l, v¯l ∈ Vl, x ∈ X and s ∈ Sl,
∣∣Φi(s, x, va, vl)− Φi(s, x, va, v¯l)∣∣ ≤ βi ∑
sl∈Sl
∣∣vli(sl)− v¯li(sl)∣∣q(sl|s, x)λ(sl)
≤ βi sup
sl∈Sl
∣∣vli(sl)− v¯li(sl)∣∣ ≤ β sup
sl∈Sl
∣∣vli(sl)− v¯li(sl)∣∣.
Thus, Π is a β-contraction mapping. There is a unique v¯l ∈ Vl such that
Πi(v
a, f−i)(v¯
l)(sl) = v¯
l
i(sl) for each i ∈ I and sl ∈ Sl. Let W (v
a, f) be the set
of all φ ∈ F such that for each i ∈ I and sl ∈ Sl,
v¯li(sl) =
∫
X−i
∫
Xi
Φi(sl, xi, x−i, v
a, v¯l)φi(dxi|sl)f−i(dx−i|sl). (8)
Let v¯l be the function on Sl generated by v
a and f as above, and R(va, f)
the set of λ-equivalence classes of S-measurable selections of P (va, v¯l, ·) restricted
to Sa. Then, the convex hull co(R(v
a, f)) is the set of λ-equivalence classes of
S-measurable selections of co
(
P (va, v¯l, ·)
)
restricted to Sa. Denote Ψ(v
a, f) =
co(R(va, f))×W (va, f) for each va ∈ Va and f ∈ F .
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As shown in [37], Ψ is nonempty, convex, compact valued and upper hemi-
continuous. By Fan-Glicksberg’s Fixed Point Theorem, Ψ has a fixed point
(va
′
, f l
′
) ∈ Va × F . Let v
l′ be the mapping from Sl to R
m that is generated
by va
′
and f l
′
through the β-contraction mapping Π as above. Then va
′
is an S-
measurable selection of co
(
P (va
′
, vl
′
, ·)
)
restricted to Sa; and furthermore we have
for each i ∈ I and sl ∈ Sl,
vl
′
i (sl) =
∫
X−i
∫
Xi
Φi(sl, xi, x−i, v
a′ , vl
′
)f l
′
i (dxi|sl)f
l′
−i(dx−i|sl), (9)
Πi(v
a′ , f l
′
−i)(v
l′)(sl) = v
l′
i (sl). (10)
Following the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1, there exists an
S-measurable selection va∗ of P(va′ ,vl′ ) such that E(v
a∗ρj|G) = E(v
a′ρj |G) for each
1 ≤ j ≤ J , where the conditional expectation is taken on (Sa,S
Sa , λSa) with
λSa the normalized probability measure on (Sa,S
Sa). For any s ∈ S and x ∈
A(s), Φi(s, x, v
a′ , vl
′
) = Φi(s, x, v
a∗, vl
′
), Γ(va
′
, vl
′
, s) = Γ(va∗, vl
′
, s), and therefore
P (va
′
, vl
′
, s) = P (va∗, vl
′
, s). Thus, va∗ is an S-measurable selection of P(va∗,vl′ ),
and there exists an S-measurable mapping fa∗ : Sa →
⊗
i∈IM(Xi) such that
fa∗(s) is a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(va∗, vl
′
, s) and va∗(s)
the corresponding equilibrium payoff.
Let v∗(s) be va∗(s) for s ∈ Sa and v
l′(s) for s ∈ Sl, and f
∗(s) be fa∗(s) for s ∈ Sa
and f l
′
(s) for s ∈ Sl. For sa ∈ Sa, since v
a∗ is a measurable selection of P(va∗,vl′ ) on
Sa, the equilibrium property of f
a∗(sa) then implies that Equations (1) and (2) hold
for v∗ and f∗. Next, for sl ∈ Sl, the identity Φi(sl, x, v
a′ , vl
′
) = Φi(sl, x, v
a∗, vl
′
)
implies that Equations (9) and (10) still hold when va
′
is replaced by va∗, which
means that Equations (1) and (2) hold for v∗ and f∗. Therefore, f∗ is a stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 2
In this subsection, we shall follow the notations in Subsection 4.1. As discussed in
Remark 1, a noisy stochastic game is a stochastic game with endogenous shocks
in which Hd and Xd are both singletons. As a result, we can slightly abuse the
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notations by viewing QR to be a mapping from H × R to [0, 1], and its Radon-
Nikodym derivative ψ to be a mapping defined on H×R. For simplicity, we denote
νh(·) = QR(·|h).
Let λ(Z) =
∫
H
∫
R
1Z(h, r)ψ(r|h)ν(dr)κ(dh) for all Z ∈ S, and G = H⊗{∅, R}.
Recall that φ(·|s, x) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of QH(·|s, x) with respect to
κ. For each (s, x), φ(·|s, x) is a mapping which does not depend on r, and hence
is G-measurable. We need to show that S has no G-atom under λ.
Fix any Borel subset D ⊆ S with λ(D) > 0. There is a measurable mapping
α from (D,SD) to (L,B) such that α can generate the σ-algebra SD, where L is
the unit interval endowed with the Borel σ-algebra B. Let g(h, r) = h for each
(h, r) ∈ D, Dh = {r : (h, r) ∈ D} and HD = {h ∈ H : νh(Dh) > 0}.
Denote gh(·) = g(h, ·) and αh(·) = α(h, ·) for each h ∈ HD. Define a mapping
f : HD × L → [0, 1] as follow: f(h, l) =
νh
(
α−1
h
([0,l])
)
νh(Dh)
. Similarly, denote fh(·) =
f(h, ·) for each h ∈ HD. For κ-almost all h ∈ HD, the atomlessness of νh implies
νh ◦ α
−1
h ({l}) = 0 for all l ∈ L. Thus, the distribution function fh(·) is continuous
on L for κ-almost all h ∈ HD.
Let γ(s) = f(g(s), α(s)) for each s ∈ D, and D0 = γ
−1([0, 12 ]), which is a
subset of D. For h ∈ HD, let lh be max{l ∈ L : fh(l) ≤
1
2} if fh is continuous,
and 0 otherwise. When fh is continuous, fh(lh) = 1/2. For any E ∈ H, let
D1 = (E ×R) ∩D, and E1 = E ∩HD. If λ(D1) = 0, then
λ(D0 \D1) = λ(D0) =
∫
HD
νh ◦ α
−1
h ◦ f
−1
h
(
[0,
1
2
]
)
κ(dh)
=
∫
HD
νh
(
α−1h ([0, lh])
)
κ(dh) =
∫
HD
f(h, lh)νh(Dh)κ(dh)
=
1
2
∫
HD
νh(Dh)κ(dh) =
1
2
λ(D) > 0.
If λ(D1) > 0, then
λ(D1 \D0) =
∫
E1
∫
R
1D\D0(h, r)νh(dr)κ(dh) =
∫
E1
νh ◦ α
−1
h ◦ f
−1
h
(
(
1
2
, 1]
)
κ(dh)
=
∫
E1
νh ◦ α
−1
h ◦ f
−1
h
(
[0, 1] \ [0,
1
2
]
)
κ(dh) =
1
2
∫
E1
νh(Dh)κ(dh) =
1
2
λ(D1) > 0.
Hence, D is not a G-atom. Therefore, S has no G-atom and the condition of coarser
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transition kernel is satisfied.
8.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that the atomless part of the state transition satisfies the decomposable
coarser transition kernel condition with respect to some probability measure λ
on (S,S). Given the form of the state transition Q(s, x), the atomless part
of λ concentrates on Sa = [0, 1) while λ has an atom at Sl = {1}. For
simplicity, we replace the notation (Sa,S
Sa , λ|Sa) as used in Section 5. Let S˜
be Sa = [0, 1), λ˜ the restriction λ|S˜ , and S˜ the Borel σ-algebra on S˜ = [0, 1). For
some positive integer J , the Radon-Nikodym derivative q˜(s˜|s, x) (s˜ ∈ S˜) of (the
atomless part) Q˜(s, x)U(s, 1) with respect to λ (and λ˜ as well) can be expressed as∑
1≤j≤J q˜j(s˜, s, x)ρj(s˜) for any s ∈ S and x ∈ X, where q˜j is product measurable,
q˜j(·, s, x) and ρj(·) are nonnegative and λ˜-integrable. Moreover, for some sub-σ-
algebra G of S˜ on S˜ = [0, 1), q˜j(·, s, x) is G-measurable for each j, s, x, and S˜ has
no G-atom under λ˜.
Fix any s ∈ [0, 1), and an action profile x0 with players C, C ′, D and D′ playing
the strategy 1; then Q˜(s, x0) = (1−s)16 . It follows form the above paragraph that
U(s, 1) is absolutely continuous with respect to λ˜ with the corresponding Radon-
Nikodym derivative q(s˜|s) (s˜ ∈ [0, 1)) to be
∑
1≤j≤J
16
(1−s) q˜j(s˜, s, x
0)ρj(s˜). Denote
16
(1−s) q˜j(s˜, s, x
0) by qj(s˜, s). Then, we have q(s˜|s) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(s˜, s)ρj(s˜) for any
s˜ ∈ [0, 1), where qj(·, s) is G-measurable.
It follows from the previous paragraph that the Lebesgue measure η = U(0, 1)
is absolutely continuous with respect to λ˜ with the corresponding Radon-Nikodym
derivative q(·|0) (to be denoted by q¯(·) for simplicity). Let D˜ = {s˜ ∈ [0, 1): q¯(s˜) >
0}. Then λ˜(D˜) > 0 and η(D˜c) =
∫
D˜c
q¯(s˜)λ˜(ds˜) = 0, where D˜c is the complement
of the set D˜ in [0, 1). The Radon-Nikodym derivative of U(s, 1) with respect to
the Lebesgue measure η on [0, 1) is:
qˆ(s˜|s) =


1
1−s s˜ ∈ [s, 1),
0 s˜ ∈ [0, s).
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Hence, the Radon-Nikodym derivative q(·|s) of U(s, 1) with respect to λ˜ can be
expressed as qˆ(·|s)q¯(·). Thus, we have q(s˜|s) = qˆ(s˜|s)q¯(s˜) =
∑
1≤j≤J qj(s˜, s)ρj(s˜)
for any s˜ ∈ [0, 1).
Denote Dj = {s˜ ∈ D˜ : ρj(s˜) = 0} for 1 ≤ j ≤ J . Since q¯(s˜) > 0 for all
s˜ ∈ D˜ and qˆ(s˜|s) > 0 for 0 ≤ s ≤ s˜ < 1, we must have ∩1≤j≤JDj = ∅, and hence
λ˜
(
∩1≤j≤J Dj
)
= 0.
First suppose that λ˜(Dj) = 0 for all j. Let D¯ = ∪1≤j≤JDj ; then λ˜(D¯) = 0.
Fix s′ ∈ [0, 1). Let Ej = {s˜ ∈ D˜ : qj(s˜, s
′) = 0} and E0 = ∩1≤j≤JEj . Then
Ej ∈ G
D˜ for 1 ≤ j ≤ J , and hence E0 ∈ G
D˜. For any s˜ ∈ [s′, 1) ∩ D˜, since
q(s˜|s′) = qˆ(s˜|s′)q¯(s˜) > 0, there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ J such that qj(s˜|s
′) > 0, which means
that s˜ /∈ Ej and s˜ /∈ E0. Hence, E0 ⊆ [0, s
′)∩D˜. For any s˜ ∈
(
([0, s′) ∩ D˜) \ D¯
)
, we
have q(s˜|s′) = 0 and ρj(s˜) > 0 for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J , which implies that qj(s˜|s
′) = 0
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ J , and s˜ ∈ E0. That is,
(
([0, s′) ∩ D˜) \ D¯
)
⊆ E0. Hence,
λ˜(E0△([0, s
′) ∩ D˜)) = 0. Therefore, [0, s′) ∩ D˜ ∈ GD˜ for all s′ ∈ [0, 1). Since the
class of intervals {[0, s′)}s′∈[0,1) generates the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1), we obtain
that GD˜ coincides with S˜D˜ under λ˜. Thus, S˜ has a G-atom D˜ under λ˜. This is a
contradiction.
Next suppose that λ˜(Dj) = 0 does not hold for all j. Then there exists a set, say
D1, such that λ˜(D1) > 0. Let Z = {K ⊆ {1, . . . , J} : 1 ∈ K, λ˜(D
K) > 0}, where
DK = ∩j∈KDj. Hence, {1} ∈ Z, Z is finite and nonempty. Let K0 be the element
in Z containing most integers; that is,
∣∣K0∣∣ ≥ ∣∣K∣∣ for any K ∈ Z, where ∣∣K∣∣ is the
cardinality of K. By the definition of K0, λ˜
(
DK0
)
> 0. Let Kc0 = {1, . . . , J} \K0.
Then Kc0 is nonempty since λ˜
(
∩1≤j≤J Dj
)
= 0. In addition, λ˜
(
DK0 ∩ Dj
)
= 0
for any j ∈ Kc0. Otherwise, λ˜
(
DK0 ∩Dj
)
> 0 for some j ∈ Kc0 and hence the set
K0 ∪ {j} is in Z, which contradicts the choice of K0. Let Dˆ = ∪k∈Kc
0
(
DK0 ∩Dk
)
;
then λ˜(Dˆ) = 0. For all s˜ ∈ DK0 , q(s˜|s) =
∑
k∈Kc
0
qk(s˜, s)ρk(s˜) for all s ∈ [0, 1).
Fix s′ ∈ [0, 1). Let Ek = {s˜ ∈ D˜ : qk(s˜, s
′) = 0} and EKc
0
= ∩k∈Kc
0
Ek.
Then Ek ∈ G
D˜ for any k and hence EKc
0
∈ GD˜. For any s˜ ∈ [s′, 1) ∩ D˜, since
q(s˜|s′) > 0, there exists k ∈ Kc0 such that qk(s˜, s
′) > 0, which means that s˜ /∈ Ek
and s˜ /∈ EKc
0
. Hence, EKc
0
⊆ [0, s′) ∩ D˜, and EKc
0
∩ DK0 ⊆ [0, s′) ∩ DK0 . Now,
for any s˜ ∈
((
[0, s′) ∩DK0
)
\ Dˆ
)
, we have q(s˜|s′) = 0, and ρk(s˜) > 0 for each
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k ∈ Kc0, which implies that qk(s˜, s
′) = 0 for each k ∈ Kc0, and s˜ ∈ EKc0 . That is,((
[0, s′) ∩DK0
)
\ Dˆ
)
⊆ EKc
0
∩ DK0 . Hence, ([0, s′] ∩ DK0) \ (EKc
0
∩ DK0) ⊆ Dˆ,
and λ˜
(
(EKc
0
∩DK0)△([0, s′] ∩DK0)
)
= 0. Therefore, [0, s′] ∩DK0 ∈ GD
K0 for all
s′ ∈ [0, 1). By the fact that the class of intervals {[0, s′)}s′∈[0,1) generates the Borel
σ-algebra on [0, 1), we obtain that GD
K0 coincides with S˜D
K0 under λ˜. Thus, S˜
has a G-atom DK0 under λ˜. This is again a contradiction.
8.6 Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
Proof of Proposition 4. Define a correspondence
G(s) =


{0, 1} s ∈ D;
{0} s /∈ D.
We claim that I
(S,G,λ)
G 6= I
(S,G,λ)
co(G) . Let g1(s) =
1
21D, where 1D is the indicator
function of the set D. Then g1 is an S-measurable selection of co(G). If there is
an S-measurable selection g2 of G such that E
λ(g1|G) = E
λ(g2|G), then there is a
subset D2 ⊆ D such that g2(s) = 1D2 . Since D is a G-atom, for any S-measurable
subset E ⊆ D, there is a subset E1 ∈ G such that λ(E△(E1 ∩D)) = 0. Then
λ(E ∩D2) =
∫
S
1E(s)g2(s)λ(ds) =
∫
S
E
λ
(
1E11Dg2|G
)
dλ =
∫
S
1E1E
λ
(
g2|G
)
dλ
=
∫
S
1E1E
λ
(
g1|G
)
dλ =
1
2
∫
S
1E11D dλ =
1
2
λ(E1 ∩D) =
1
2
λ(E).
Thus, λ(D2) =
1
2λ(D) > 0 by choosing E = D. However, λ(D2) =
1
2λ(D2) by
choosing E = D2, which implies that λ(D2) = 0. This is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that there exists an S-measurable selection g of
G such that Eλ(gρn|F) = 0 for any n ≥ 0. Then there exists a set E ∈ S such that
g(s) =


1 s ∈ E;
−1 s /∈ E.
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Thus,
λ(E)− λ(Ec) =
∫
S
gρ0 dλ =
∫
S
E
λ(gρ0|F) dλ = 0,
which implies λ(E) = 12 . Moreover,
∫
S
g̺n dλ =
∫
S
gρn dλ−
∫
S
g dλ =
∫
S
E
λ(gρn|F) dλ− 0 = 0
for each n ≥ 1, which contradicts with the condition that {̺n}n≥0 is a complete
orthogonal system.
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